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who
should
over
remgee
law?
By James C. Hathaway

The following essay is based on a talk
delivered at the Global Consultation on
lnternational Protection convened by the
lnternational Council of Voluntary Agencies
(ICVA) in Geneva on Dec. 11, 2001, on the
occasion of celebrating the 50th anniversary
of the Refugee Conventionand the Ministerial
Meeting of States Parties to the 1951
Refugee Convention andlor its 1967
Protocol, held Dec. 12-13, 2001. Under the
author's supervision, students in the
University of Michigan Law School's
Program in Asylum Law produced researchbased working papers to assist the ICVA and
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in
discussing implementation of the Refugee
Convention. (See related story on page 11.)
A complete version of this talk is to appear in
issue 13 of Forced Migration Review in May
2002. (See w.w.w.fmreview.org for back
issues and subscription information; the
journal is published in English, Spanish, and'
Arabic.) This excerpt appears with permission I
of Forced Migration Review.

54 THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN
LAWSCHOOL

The fact that states have now committed
themselves "... to consider ways that may
be required to strengthen the
implementation of the 1951 Convention
and/or 1967 Protocol" is a wonderful
thing. We should celebrate the fact that
after a half-century, we may finally be on
the verge of taking oversight of the treaty
seriously.
I am concerned, however, that having
watched this matter languish for half a
century, activists may now feel the need
immediately to build on this new
commitment by endorsing some kind of a
mechanism - even if only a minimally
effective one - for overseeing the Refugee
Convention. I worry that we may allow
ourselves to be rushed into embracing a
particular model for oversight of refugee
rights in order to lock-in at least some
progress on this issue, only to find that we
have committed ourselves to an approach
that, in the long run, really is inadequate.
While there is of course the possibility that
a minimalist project may provide the
experience and confidence needed to move
in a more ambitious direction in the future,
there is also the possibility that states will
take the view that, having established a
minimalist mechanism, they have "dealt
with the supervision question." Thus, they
might argue, there is no need to revisit the
issue, at least not any time soon.
We simply cannot afford to sell out the
future of refugee protection in a hasty bid
to establish something that looks, more or
less, like an oversight mechanism for the
Refugee Convention.
To be clear, this debate is not about
how to stay on top of UNHCR [United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees]
as an agency. UNHCR has a mandate that
is much broader than supervising the
Refugee Convention. In recent years, its
work as a humanitarian relief agency has,
in fact, come to overshadow its core
protection functions. Its work on behalf of
the internally displaced has in many

instances eclipsed its primary duty to
protect refugees. It has often taken on roles
that put it into the realm of the political,
notwithstanding its explicitly non-political
mandate. While there can and should be
initiatives more effectively to supervise
UNCHR as an agency, these are matters
which, to my mind, are logically entrusted
to UNHCR's executive committee
(EXCOM), or indeed to the ECOSOC [UN
Economic and Social Council] itself. We
should not allow the question of how best
to oversee the Refugee Convention to be
redirected toward difficult but distinct
questions of supervising UNHCR's
compliance with its broader statutory
mandate, much less of how to monitor the
various jobs it has taken on outside of its
mandate.
On the other hand, it is equally wrong
for UNHCR to attempt artificially to cut off
debate on the appropriate range of
potential mechanisms to oversee the
Refugee Convention by reliance on its
institutional authority under Article 35 of
the Refugee Convention. As we all know,
UNHCR has a special responsibility under
Article 35 to "supervise the implementation"
of the Refugee Convention. But this
provision does not create a monopoly on
treaty oversight in favor of UNHCR. To the
contrary, the Convention, as an
international pact, is the responsibility of
the states that signed it. As the mechanisms
for enforcement of the Convention itself
make clear, it is states that have the
fundamental right and duty to ensure that
other states actually live up to their
obligations under the Refugee Convention.
There is nothing in Article 35 which
precludes the states that are both the
objects and the trustees of the refugee
protection system from deciding to
establish an arms-length mechanism to
provide general guidance on, and oversight
of, the Refugee Convention. Indeed, a
move in this direction is precisely what I
believe is required now.
In considering this task, a first question
must surely be: Why is it that the Refugee
Convention, virtually alone among major
human rights treaties, still has no
freestanding mechanism to promote
interstate accountability?

In part, it is a question of history. The
Refugee Convention was the second major
human rights treaty adopted by the United
Nations, having been preceded only by the
Genocide Convention. \t is noteworthy that
the Genocide Convention, like the Refugee
Convention, is not externally supervised.
In part, then, the absence of an external
supervisory mechanism for the Refugee
Convention is simply a reflection of the
historical reality that, in the late 1940s and
early 1950s, the entire idea of interstate
supervision of human rights was new,
potentially threatening, and not truly
accepted by states. Yet with the adoption
of the human rights covenants and more
specialized treaties beginning in the
mid-l 960s, the establishment of an
independent mechanism for interstate
oversight of the human rights treaties has
become routine. Unless there is some
good, principled reason why refugee law
should be immune from this general
commitment, it is high time to reverse the
historical aberration by bringing the
commitment to oversight of refugee law
into line with the practice in human rights
law more generally.
It might be suggested, however, that it
was - and is - the existence of a United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
that distinguishes refugee law from every
other UN human rights project. Only in
refugee law is there an international
organization assigned exclusively to
supervise implementation of the treaty. At
best, other UN human rights treaties can
rely on the recently established, generic
authority of a (grossly under-funded) UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Because refugee law has its own
institutional guardian in the person of the
High Commissioner, it might be thought
that any additional mechanism for
oversight would be superfluous.
I believe that this would be a tragic
error of judgement. UNHCR clearly makes
some essential contributions to oversight of
the Convention via its supervisory
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authority codified in Article 35. In
particular, the Department of International
Protection (DIP) has real expertise in
assisting governments to draft policy and
legislation; in engaging directly and
indirectly in defensive case interventions;
and in organizing and conducting refugee
law outreach and training. DIP's role is
complemented by the critical function of
UNHCR's Executive Committee, which
symbolically reaffirms the commitment of
states to refugee law, and provides
democratic legitimacy to the agency's work.
There is therefore no need for a
mechanism of international oversight to
take on any of these roles.
But there are also some things that are
usually understood to be central to a
meaningful project of international
oversight that UNHCR does less well, and
is perhaps not ideally positioned to take
on. In practice, neither DIP nor EXCOM
has done enough to provide systematic,
non-crisis policy guidance on the substance
of refugee law, carefully anchored in the
real context of protection challenges. There
has been a lack of leadership in the design
of mechanisms to implement burden and
responsibility sharing, so as to enable the
imperatives of refugee law duties to be
reconciled to the political and social
realities of asylum states. There has not
really been a genuinely inclusive range of
voices, including those of refugees
themselves, brought into the supervisory
process. And not enough efforts have been
made to empower local institutions to
make enforcement of refugee rights
meaningful in a way that no international
institution can ever aspire to do. These are
all examples of the kinds of work which, in
most other contexts, are entrusted to an
autonomous supervisory body.
Beyond the importance of setting
reasonable expectations for the sorts of
supervisory tasks that UNHCR should itself
be expected to take on, there are two more
fundamental reasons why vesting UNHCR
with sole responsibility to oversee the
Refugee Convention is not a credible
proposition.
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First, UNHCR has been fundamentally
transformed during the 1990s from an
agency whose job was, in large measure, to
serve as trustee or guardian of refugee
rights as implemented by states, to an
agency that is now primarily focused on
direct service delivery. Simply put,
UNHCR is no longer at arms-length from
the implementation of refugee protection.
In most big refugee crises around the
world today, UNHCR is - in law or in
fact - the means by which refugee
protection is delivered on the ground.
UNHCR therefore faces a dilemma, in my
view. Either it must return to concentrating
on the implementation of its core
supervisory responsibilities, and leave what
has become the majority of its operational
mandate to others; or it must concede that
it cannot ethically supervise itself, and
endorse the establishment of a genuinely
arms-length body to ensure the oversight
of the Refugee Convention.
Second, the difficulty with relying solely
on UNHCR to oversee the Refugee
Convention is that it encourages states to
avoid the meaningful accountability
between and among themselves that is at
the root of the entire international human
rights project. Because states presently take
little if any direct responsibility for
ensuring that their fellow states live up to
international refugee law obligations, the
dynamic of persuading, cajoling, and
indeed shaming of partner states - so
critical to the success of the international
human rights project in general - is
largely absent in refugee law. It is simply
too easy to leave the task to UNHCR.
Yet, as we all know, UNHCR is not
really positioned to apply meaningful
forms of pressure on states. UNHCR is,
after all, an entity with a tiny core budget,
and which is effectively dependent on the
annual voluntary contributions of a very
small number of powerful states, virtually
none of which has been predisposed to
empower UNHCR to act autonomously to
advance a strong regime of international
refugee protection. Yes, these states have
been generous in providing funds for
refugee relief and for humanitarian
assistance. But too often they have either
avoided or, on occasion, evaded UNHCR's

insistence on the importance of protection
principles. Recent tragic events off the
coast of Australia, and the legally
indefensible domestic reaction to the
attempt to bring international law to bear
on Australia, are more than adequate
testimony to this problem.
Moreover, because UNHCR is, and will
remain, politically and fiscally constrained
by design, it cannot reasonably be expected
to provide the sort of strong voice in favor
of unflinching attention to refugee
protection that is now required. There may
also be no good reason to compromise
UNHCR's on-the-ground efforts to
promote implementation of the Refugee
Convention - which do frequently require
compromise and even expediency in the
interest of saving lives - by forcing that
same organization to be the source of
critique and broad guidance on acceptable
international practice under the Refugee
Convention. Nor may it be reasonable to
expect UNHCR, as an interstate
organization, to devise the sorts of complex
political mechanisms - involving
international burden and responsibility
sharing - that are critical to the continued
effectiveness of refugee law in the modem
world .
In short, my point is that those of us
concerned to advance refugee protection
would be ill-advised to limit the scope of
our thinking to models that are housed
within, or functionally intertwined with,
the work of UNHCR as an international
organization. By the same token, UNHCR
as an organization would be ill-advised to
insist that any mechanism to reinforce
oversight of the Refugee Convention be
situated within its walls. To do so may
simply constrain its operational
effectiveness in protection and other fields,
and reinforce the current sense of despair
among many UNHCR staff brought on by
expectations not matched by either
political independence or fiscal autonomy.

In light of these realities, we should not
rush from celebration of the critical
commitment to enhanced oversight of the
Refugee Convention secured at the meeting
of state parties in December to embrace
any particular model for oversight of the
treaty. It is critical that we take the time to
learn the lessons of treaty oversight in
other parts of the UN system. In particular,
the successes and failures of the six major
United Nations treaty bodies provide a
wealth of information, both for and against
particular modes of oversight, which we
ignore at our peril. At a time when the
chairpersons of all of the UN human rights
treaty bodies insist on regular coordination
and mutual learning, it would be sadly
ironic for those of us in the refugee
protection community to rush forward to
embrace any model not predicated on an
intimate knowledge of the range of
potential protection options.
In conclusion, we must not be
intimidated by institutional insistence that
oversight of the Refugee Convention be a
function exclusively of the UNHCR. The
High Commissioner's duty to supervise
implementation of the Convention and the
more general obligation of state parties to
take collective responsibility to oversee
their treaty obligations are, in fact,
compatible - not mutually exclusive responsibilities.

Because no precise model of oversight
for the Refugee Convention will be
adopted imminently, there is no need to
rush to embrace any particular approach.
Having waited 50 years, it is better to take
the time to engage in a solid, broadly based
initiative to build a mechanism of oversight
that will withstand the test of time. We
must commit ourselves to a process of
learning the lessons of human rights
history, and of thinking hard and creatively
about the context-specific goals of
overseeing refugee law. Only on the basis
of such a process will we be able to put
forward a model for serious, genuinely
responsive oversight of the Refugee
Convention.
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